DMARC introduces a mechanism for expressing domain-level policies and preferences for email message validation, disposition, and reporting.
Introduction
DMARC [RFC7489] introduces a mechanism for expressing domain-level policies and preferences for message validation, disposition, and reporting. The DMARC mechanism can encounter several different types of interoperability issues due to third-party message sourcing, message transformation or rerouting.
DMARC is, as this writing, an Informational RFC, however it has a significant deployment within the email community.
Cases in which email does not flow directly from the author's administrative domain to the recipients are collectively referred to in this document as indirect email flows. Due to existing and increasing adoption of DMARC, the impact of DMARC-based email rejection policies on both direct and indirect email flows can be significant.
Several known causes of interoperability issues are presented, followed by a description of components within the Internet Mail Architecture [RFC5598] where interoperability issues can arise.
Lastly, known and possible methods for addressing interoperability issues are presented. There are often multiple ways to address any given interoperability issue. While this document strives to be comprehensive in its review, it should not be treated as complete.
Document Conventions
Notation regarding structured fields is taken from [RFC5598] .
Organizational Domain and Authenticated Identifiers are specified in DMARC [RFC7489] .
Causes of Interoperability Issues
Interoperability issues between DMARC and indirect email flows arise when conformance to the DMARC specification leads an implementation to apply DMARC based policy to messages that are both compliant with the architecture as specified in [RFC5598] [RFC6376] for additional security considerations), in practice, particularly with MIME-encoded [RFC2045] messages, a mailing list processor will do more than append (See Section 5.3 of [RFC5598] for details). Furthermore, the use of the length flag is seldom found in emails in part because of its security challenges.
DKIM has two canonicalizations to use for headers and body separately: simple and relaxed. The latter allows some modest in transit modifications that do not change the interpretation of the content of the email. The relaxed canonicalization is more computing intensive and may not have been preferred in the early deployment of DKIM as this may have been more significant than today.
Internet Mail Architecture, DMARC, and Indirect Email Flows
This section describes components within the Internet Mail Architecture [RFC5598] where interoperability issues between DMARC and indirect email flows can be found. A Mediator is a special class of MUA that is given special consideration in this section due to the unique issues Mediators face when attempting to interoperate with DMARC.
Message Handling System

Message Submission Agents
An MSA accepts messages submitted by a Message User Agent (MUA) and enforces the policies of the hosting ADministrative Management Domain (ADMD) and the requirements of Internet standards. MSA interoperability issues with DMARC begin when an aMSA accepts a message where the RFC5322.From header field contains a domain that is outside of the ADMD of the MSA. The ADMD will almost certainly not be capable of sending email that yields Authenticated Identifiers aligned with the domain found in the RFC5322.From header field. Examples of this issue include "forward-to-friend" functionality commonly found on news/article websites or "send-as" functionality present on some MUAs.
When an hMSA takes responsibility for transit of a message containing a domain in the RFC5322.From header field that is outside of the hMSA's ADMD, the hMSA faces DMARC interoperability issues if the domain publishes a DMARC policy of "quarantine" or "reject". These issues are marked by an inherent difficulty in establishing alignment with the domain present in a message's RFC5322.From header field.
Examples of this issue include:
o Pseudo-open relays -a residential ISP that allows its customers to relay any domains through its infrastructure.
o Embedded devices -cable/dsl modems, firewalls, wireless access points that send email using hardcoded domains.
o Email service providers -ESPs that service customers that are using domains that publish a DMARC "reject" policy.
o Calendaring software -an invited member of an event modifies the event causing calendaring software to emit an update that appears to come from the creator of the event.
Message Transfer Agents
MTAs relay a message until the message reaches a destination MDA.
Message Encoding
An MTA may modify the message encoding, for instance by converting 8-bit MIME sections to quoted-printable 7-bit sections. This modification is outside the scope of DKIM canonicalization and will invalidate DKIM signatures that include message content. o Consolidating many email addresses into a single acccount to centralize processing.
o Services that provides "activity based", "role based" , "vanity" or "temporary" email addresses such as universities and professional associations. For instance professional or alumni institutions may offer to their members an alias for the duration of their membership but may not want to deal with the long term storage of emails.
In most cases, the aMSA providing Alias services has no administrative relationship to the ADMD of the final recipient, so solutions to Alias-related DMARC failure should not assume such a relationship.
ReSenders
ReSenders "splice" a message's addressing information to connect the Examples of ReSenders include MUA-level forwarding by resending a message to a new recipient or by forwarding a message "inline" to a new recipient (this does not include forwarding a message "as an attachment"). An additional example comes in the form of calendaring software that allows a meeting attendee (not the meeting organizer) to modify the content of an invite causing the invitations to appear to be reissued from the meeting organizer.
Mailing Lists
A Mailing List receives messages as an explicit addressee and then re-posts them to a list of subscribed members. The Mailing List performs a task that can be viewed as an elaboration of the ReSender. These changes are common for many mailing lists and receivers are used to them. Furthermore MUA expects certain mailing list behavior in presenting emails to the end users
Gateways
A Gateway performs the basic routing and transfer work of message relaying, but it also is permitted to modify content, structure, address, or attributes as needed to send the message into a messaging environment that operates under different standards or potentially incompatible policies.
Gateways share the same DMARC interoperability issues as ReSenders (Section 3.2.2).
Gateways may share also the same DMARC interoperability issues as MTAs (Section 3.1.2).
Gateway-level forwarding can introduce DMARC interoperability issues
if the Gateway is configured to rewrite the message to map between recipient domains. For example, an acquisition may lead the acquiring company to decide to decommission the acquired company's domains by rewriting messages to use the domain of the acquiring company. Since the RFC5322.To header field is usually DKIM-signed, this kind of rewriting will also cause DKIM signatures to fail.
Boundary Filters
To enforce security boundaries, organizations can subject messages to analysis for conformance with their safety policies. A filter might alter the content to render it safe, such as by removing content deemed unacceptable.
Boundary Filters share the same DMARC interoperability issues as ReSenders.
Issues may arise if SPF and DKIM is evaluated after the filter modifications. o Secondary MX services. In this case, however, it is inappropriate for a primary MX server to perform an SPF check against its own secondaries. Rather, the secondary MX should perform this function.
Examples of Boundary
Combinations
The causes of indirect email flows can be combined. For example, a university student may subscribe to a mailing list (using his university email address) while this university email address is configured to forward all emails to a freemail provider where a more permanent email address for this student exists.
Within an organization the message may pass through various MTAs (Section 3.1.2), each of which performs a different function (authentication, filtering, distribution, etc.)
Possible Mitigations of Interoperability Issues
Solutions to interoperability issues between DMARC and indirect email flows vary widely in their scope and implications. They range from improvements to underlying processors, such as proper handling of multiple DKIM signatures, to more radical approaches to the messaging architecture. This section describes possible ways to address interoperability issues.
Mail systems are diverse and widely deployed and are expected to continue to work with old systems. For instance, Qmail is still used and the base code has not been updated since 1998. Ezmlm, a once popular mailing list manager, is still deployed and has not been updated since 1997, although a new version, Ezmlm-idx exists. In this constrained environment, some solutions may be time-consuming and/or disruptive to implement.
DMARC provides for receivers to make decisions about identity alignment acceptability based on information outside DMARC and communicate those decisions as "overrides" to the sender. This facility can be used to ease some interoperability issues, although care is needed to ensure that this does not create loopholes that abusers can use arbitrarily. Since most list subscribers prefer to know the identity of the author of the original message, typically this information may be provided in the display name part of the RFC5322.From header field. This display name needs to be carefully crafted as to not collide with the original display name of the author, nor contain something that looks like an email address or domain name. These modifications may to some extent defeat the purpose of DMARC itself. It may make it difficult to ensure that users of all email clients can easily reply to the author, the list, or all using the email client features provided for that purpose. Use of RFC5322.Reply-To header field can alleviate this problem depending on whether the mailing list is configured to reply-to-list, replyto-author or reply-to-fixed-address, however it is important to note that this header field can take multiple email addresses. When altering the RFC5322.From there are two possibilities, to change it to put the mailing list email address, or to change it to add a suffix like ".invalid" to the domain of the email address present there. The later modification may create issues because it is an invalid domain name, and some MTAs may take particular attention to the validity of email addresses in RFC5322.From and the reputation of the domains present there.
o Another mitigation policy is to configure the MLM to "wrap" the message in a MIME message/rfc822 part and to send as the Mailing List email address. All these techniques may provide some specific challenges in MUAs and different operational usages for end users (like rewriting filters to sort emails in folders). There will be some time before all implications are understood and alleviated.
Proposed and In-Progress Mitigations
The following mitigations are based on Internet Drafts which have not yet received broad consensus. They are described here to offer exploratory path for solutions. These solutions should not be used in a production environment. In practice a number of operators are using strict alignment mode in DMARC in order to avoid receiving new and innovative forms of unwanted and unauthentic email through systems purporting to be mailing list handlers. The receiving ADMD has no knowledge of which lists the user has subscribed to and which they have not. One avenue of exploration would be for the user to authorize mailing lists as proxies for authentication, at which point the receiving ADMD would be vesting some trust in the mailing list service. The creators of DKIM foresaw precisely this possibility at the time by not tightly binding any semantics to the RFC5322.From header field. Some experimental work has taken place in this area, as mentioned above.
Additional work might examine a new communication path to the user to authorize some form of transitive trust.
IANA Considerations
This document contains no actions for IANA. [RFC Editor: Please delete this section prior to publication.]
Security Considerations
This document is an analysis of DMARC's impact on indirect email flows. It describes the possibility of accidental denial-of-service that can be created by rejections of messages by DMARC-aware Mail Receivers. However, it introduces no new security issues to Internet messaging.
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